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Speaking for Others: 
The Pros and Cons of
Group Advocates using
Collective Language
Matthew J. Hornsey and Leda Blackwood
University of Queensland
Anne O’Brien
University of Exeter
We examined how rhetorical style affects evaluations of group advocates, and how these
evaluations are moderated by group identification. University students were given a letter to the
editor defending student welfare. The argument was either constructed using personal language
(‘I believe’) or collective language (‘we believe’). Furthermore, the letter was either attributed
to an official advocate (president of the student union) or an unofficial advocate (a rank-and-file
member of the student body). Consistent with the social identity perspective, participants who
showed strong identification as a university student thought that the group would feel better
represented by official advocates using collective rather than personal language. Low identifiers,
however, did not rate the rhetorical styles differently on representativeness. Furthermore, low
identifiers (but not high identifiers) rated official advocates as more likable and more effective
when they used personal rather than collective language. The discussion focuses on the conflict
low identifiers might feel between (a) needing to homogenize with other group members in
order to maximize the influence and political effectiveness of their message at the collective
level, and (b) protecting themselves against categorization threat.
keywords categorization threat, collective action, group advocates, language and
intergroup relations
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THE FUNCTIONING of a liberal democracy is
contingent on formalized processes for the
representation of group-based interests. From
the industrial shop-floor steward to the Head of
State, our public and private lives are crossed 
by those who claim to speak for us—for our
values and for our interests as defined by our
group memberships. Effective collective action
rests on the skills of these people to prosecute
the interests of their groups and to achieve
positive change.
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The job of an advocate is complex because he
or she has multiple audiences. One role of the
advocate is to influence a rival group. Political
conflict typically involves the struggle between
groups for resources, power, and/or prestige,
and success can be gauged by the extent to
which the advocate can win concessions from
relevant outgroups. But to achieve this goal,
groups often have to win over the support of
critical third parties (e.g. the general public).
Many intergroup struggles are played out within
this wider social context, and so one goal of the
advocate might be to convince the general
public of the legitimacy and importance of the
group’s claims (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).
In addition, advocates must be mindful of their
internal audience (the members of the group
that they represent). Indeed, the perceived
success and longevity of an advocate depends
crucially on how effective other group members
think he or she is in terms of promoting change,
and in accurately representing the group. In
sum, the commonsense view would be that advo-
cates are seen to succeed or fail on the basis of
their ability to (a) credibly identify and prose-
cute the interests of a group; and (b) convince
members of that group that they have done so.
The focus of the current study is on how
advocates are evaluated by their internal
audience; that is, other ingroup members. We
examine how ingroup members evaluate those
who represent their group’s interests, and how
these evaluations differ as a function of their
identification with their group and the advo-
cate’s rhetorical style. Specifically, we examine
whether it is more effective for an advocate to
use collective language (‘We believe’) or to frame
the argument as a personal attitude (‘I believe’).
Using an experimental paradigm, we demon-
strate below how choice of language and identi-
fication interact in theoretically predictable ways
to affect the perceived likability, effectiveness,
and representativeness of an advocate.
Does the type of language matter?
When attempting to persuade others of the
legitimacy of a group’s concerns, people have a
choice as to what rhetorical style they use. On
the one hand, they can emphasize the personal
nature of the attitude (‘I believe’) in the hope
that their testimonial will help foster sympathy
for the cause of the wider group. Alternatively,
they can speak on behalf of the wider group
(‘We believe’).
There is a convergence of theory and research
that speaks to the appropriateness of the latter
strategy when engaging in political action. For
example, the use of collective language helps
signal solidarity and unity which, according to
research on minority influence, is fundamen-
tally important when it comes to influencing
the views of the majority (Maass & Clark, 1984;
Moscovici, 1976; Mugny & Perez, 1991). By
using collective language, the advocate indi-
cates that the group feels certainty in, and
strong commitment to, its message. This helps
promote uncertainty and doubt regarding the
issue in the minds of the majority and helps
draw attention to the minority group as a coher-
ent entity that deserves to be taken seriously. So,
for outgroup audiences at least (e.g. the gen-
eral public; rival groups), it can be expected
that collective language will be more effective
than personal language.
A second reason that collective language
might be more effective is that it helps empha-
size the ongoing loyalty and commitment of the
advocate to their constituency (the ingroup
members). In order to explicate the underlying
mechanisms affecting this relationship, we turn
to the social identity perspective on group pro-
cesses. The basic premise of social identity
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its extension,
self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, 1991), is
that an important part of our sense of self
derives from the groups to which we belong (see
Hogg, 2002; Turner, 1999, for recent reviews).
According to this social identity perspective, the
more strongly people identify with a salient
group, the more they will depersonalize around
the prototype of the group. Rather than relying
on idiosyncratic attitudes, memories, and behav-
iors that distinguish themselves from other
individuals (their ‘personal identities’), high
identifiers are more likely to converge to the
collective attitudes, memories, and behaviors
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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that define their group in opposition to other
groups. Thus, according to the social identity
perspective of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Turner
& Haslam, 2001), a highly prototypical leader
does not need to be explicitly coercive in order
to win support from other group members.
Rather, by virtue of the fact that they represent
the group prototype, influence will occur spon-
taneously and automatically as group members
cognitively and behaviorally assimilate them-
selves to those features. Consistent with this,
there is growing empirical evidence that leaders
are seen to be more effective, likable, and fair
the more they embody the attitudes and behav-
iors of the group prototype (Fielding & Hogg,
1997; Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Haslam et al.,
1998; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Platow, Reid,
& Andrew, 1998; van Vugt & de Cremer, 1999).
Social identities, however, are not static and
tangible things; rather, they are highly contex-
tual (e.g. Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, &
Hayes, 1992; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty,
1994). What represents the prototype of the
group can shift depending on the intergroup
context, and so leaders that encapsulate the
defining features of the group in one context
might be seen as less prototypical in other con-
texts. The challenge for leaders, then, is to
manage their rhetoric such that they are contin-
ually adapting to the changing context and
locating themselves as central members of the
group. Through the strategic use of language,
identities can be socially constructed, and to a
degree, manipulated (e.g. Hopkins & Reicher,
1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). For example,
Reicher and Hopkins (1996a) described how an
anti-abortionist’s speech to a medical audience
was managed in such a way that he claimed
common ingroup membership with the audi-
ence. Others have described examples of poli-
ticians constructing their rhetoric such that
their party is portrayed as representative of a
broad national ingroup (Rapley, 1998; Reicher
& Hopkins, 1996b). Given that people are typi-
cally more open to messages from ingroup than
from outgroup speakers (Hornsey, Oppes, &
Svensson, 2002; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion,
1990), and that prototypical group members
are typically seen to be more persuasive than
peripheral group members (Hogg, 2001; van
Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994), such a
strategy makes perfect sense.
One way to rhetorically emphasize common
ingroup membership is to use collective lan-
guage (e.g. ‘we believe’). Indeed, Brewer and
Gardner (1996) found that the mere process of
priming the word ‘we’ was enough to increase
the extent to which people used collective self-
descriptions. Collective language, then, might
send out the message that the advocate is
invested in and representative of the group,
perceptions that are critical in gaining favor. In
sum, the use of collective language is predicted
to be effective in two ways: first, in terms of
influencing outgroups, and second, in terms 
of winning over the trust and compliance of
ingroup members.
Despite this, there might be some circum-
stances under which collective language would
be rejected by group members. Speaking on
behalf of the group assumes both homogeneity
in the group and agreement about what the
prototypical position is. In reality, this is rare;
groups are not flat, undifferentiated entities.
Although group members share at least one
dimension in common (e.g. ‘we are all women’),
they may have different conceptualizations
about what this identity means and different
levels of commitment to the identity (Kelly &
Breinlinger, 1996). Furthermore, groups often
embrace a diversity of subgroups defined by
intragroup role assignments or by wider social
category memberships (e.g. profession, socio-
economic status, ethnicity). These individual
and subgroup differences can manifest them-
selves as internal struggles over status and the
related power to define the group’s values
(Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002;
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Sani & Reicher,
1998, 2000). So when an advocate speaks ‘on
behalf of the group’, group members have the
right to question just who within the group the
advocate is representing.
Does identification matter?
One key difference that exists among members
of groups is the degree to which they identify
Hornsey et al. language and group advocacy
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with the group. For some people, the group
might be a fundamental part of one’s self-
concept in that it is chronically accessible, it
arouses positive affect, and it commands strong
behavioral commitment. For others, though,
the group might be something rarely thought
about, and categorization as a member of the
group might evoke little emotion, or even nega-
tive affect. For these low identifiers, the group
does not form an important part of the self-
concept and there is little behavioral commit-
ment to the group.
We would argue that the extent to which
group members identify with their group is a key
factor in moderating evaluations of collective
and personal language. When an advocate uses
collective language (‘we’), they are essentially
imposing a common or shared category on
group members. By speaking on behalf of the
group, advocates are sending out the message
‘we are all group members, and we are all the
same’. High identifiers might be perfectly
happy to be categorized in this way, because
such a categorization is consistent with their
self-definition in that context. Low identifiers,
however, might feel less comfortable with
collective language, because the way they are
being categorized is incompatible with their
self-definition, resulting in resentment and dis-
comfort.
In the language of the social identity perspec-
tive, the negativity associated with being cat-
egorized by others against one’s will is called
‘categorization threat’ (Branscombe, Ellemers,
Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Categorization threat
can emerge in two ways. First, people might feel
discomfort if they are categorized in a way that
is inappropriate for that context. For example,
women may wish to be categorized as a pro-
fessional at work, and feel threatened if they
are instead categorized in terms of their gender
(Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998). Alternatively,
categorization threat might be experienced if
people are categorized as a member of a group
that does not form an important part of the 
self-concept. For example, if being a university
student is not an important part of a person’s
self-concept, then they might feel some level of
resentment about being categorized as such
(Barreto & Ellemers, 2002). Unlike most forms
of threat, then, this form of categorization
threat is assumed to be felt most keenly by low
identifiers.
In sum, we argue that high identifiers are
more likely to have assimilated to the norms,
values, and attitudes of the group. As a result,
they might be quite willing to be categorized as
a group member, and to be seen by others in
this way. In the absence of categorization threat,
high identifiers might prefer collective over
personal language (a) because it signals
strength and cohesion to outgroups, and (b)
because it signals to the ingroup that the advo-
cate feels embedded within the wider group
identity. In contrast, low identifiers might be
more mindful of protecting their individual dis-
tinctiveness and might be more likely to feel
they have been categorized against their will.
For low identifiers, then, the preference for
collective over personal language might be
eliminated or even reversed.
Does type of advocate matter?
When operationalizing the research questions
described above, one is faced with a critical
question: What type of advocate are we talking
about? Some advocates are ‘official’ representa-
tives (e.g. politicians, activists, advocates, lobby-
ists) who have been employed or elected for the
specific purpose of representing the interests of
the group. But not all advocates play this role in
an official sense. Sometimes, advocates are
rank-and-file group members who have sponta-
neously decided to take political action: the
concerned individual who fires off a letter to
the editor or steps up to the megaphone at a
rally. Although there is limited research relating
to this question, it is possible that the choice of
language might have different ramifications for
official than for unofficial advocates.
As argued earlier, collective language might
be beneficial for an advocate because it locates
them as a central member of the group, thus
potentially maximizing their influence. But it is
reasonable to expect that this is not a mindless,
hydraulic process; presumably people are
capable of consciously weighing up the identity
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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claims made by the advocate with the objective
credentials of the speaker (see Hornsey &
Jetten, 2003, for a related discussion on impos-
tors). At times, official representatives can be
criticized for being too distant from the groups
that they claim to represent. An official advo-
cate (e.g. union leader, politician) often
accrues power, prestige, and material reward
over and above the intrinsic rewards associated
with defending the group. As such, they are
often depicted as having been seduced by their
position and as having forgotten what it is like
to be ‘one of us’. Indeed, it is a paradox of the
social identity model of leadership that the very
process of being identified as a leader implies a
separateness from followers, which in turn has
the potential to ‘sever the empathic intragroup
bond’ (Hogg, 2001, p. 195). At worst, our rep-
resentatives may be seen as being of another
group altogether—a reviled group of politicians
or activists—who have one eye on serving their
constituency and the other eye on serving 
their long-term individual career goals as
advocates. For this reason, group members
(particularly low identifiers) might feel rela-
tively comfortable hearing collective language
(‘we believe’) from a rank-and-file member who
‘emerges’ from the crowd and spontaneously
takes on the role of fighting for the welfare of
the group. In contrast, they might feel that an
official advocate did not have the same entitle-
ment to speak as though they share the experi-
ences and aspirations of the group.
The current experiment
The current research aims to investigate the
relationship between individuals’ level of group
identification and their evaluation of a group
advocate who uses collective or personal lan-
guage. In the study, university students read and
evaluated a letter to the editor of a national
newspaper, in which the author criticized the
level of government funding for universities.
The letter was attributed either to an official
representative (the president of the student
union) or an unofficial representative (an
ordinary university student). Furthermore, the
author used either collective language or
personal language. After reading the letter, the
participants evaluated the extent to which they
thought the letter would be effective in terms of
changing public opinion, the extent to which
they had positive regard for the author, and the
extent to which they believed the group would
feel well represented by the letter.
On the basis of the social identity perspective,
we expected that those who identified strongly
as a university student would be more positive
about the letter overall (i.e. they would see the
letter to be more effective, they would be more
positive about the author, and they would feel
better represented) than would those who have
weak identification as a university student
(Hypothesis 1). We also predicted, however, that
the effects of identification would be moderated
by the type of language the advocate used. On
the basis of work on social identity and
categorization threat, we speculated that low
identifiers would prefer advocates to use per-
sonal rather than collective language (Hypothesis
2). In contrast, we expected that high identi-
fiers would rate advocates more favorably when
they used collective rather than personal lan-
guage (Hypothesis 3).
Given the lack of previous research and
theory relating to the distinction between
official and unofficial advocates, no strong pre-
dictions could be made with regard to how this
variable might interact with language. However,
on the basis of the arguments described above,
we tentatively predict that participants would be
more sensitive to the rhetorical strategies of
official than of unofficial advocates. Thus, the
effects of language described in Hypotheses 2
and 3 might be particularly pronounced for
official (as opposed to unofficial) representa-
tives (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants and design
A total of 187 Australian undergraduate psy-
chology students participated for course credit.
The sample consisted of 39 males and 148
females (M = 20.29 years of age). The study was
a 2 (Advocate Type: official versus unofficial) 
2 (Language: collective versus personal)  2
Hornsey et al. language and group advocacy
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(Identification: low versus high) between-
subjects design. Participants were randomly
allocated to the levels of the two manipulated
variables: advocate type and language. Group
identification was a measured variable.
Procedure
Participants were told that the study was exam-
ining attitudes toward student issues. To obtain
a general gauge of participants’ attitudes
toward government funding for universities,
participants first rated the extent to which they
agreed with the statement: ‘University students
get a good deal in terms of government funding
for university education’ (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree). Participants then com-
pleted a three-item identification scale: ‘Being a
university student is an important part of my
self-image’; ‘I identify as a university student’;
and ‘I have a lot in common with other uni-
versity students’ (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree;  = .75).
Participants were then given what they were
led to believe was an authentic letter to the
editor of a nationally distributed broadsheet
newspaper (in fact the letter was scripted by the
experimenters). In each condition, the letter
presented arguments against recent cuts in
higher education and increased fees for stu-
dents. Type of advocate was manipulated by
attributing the letter to either an ordinary stu-
dent (unofficial advocate) or to the President
of the National Union of Students (official
advocate). The name of the author of the letter
(D. Henderson) was such that their gender was
ambiguous.
Language was manipulated in the letters such
that for half of the participants the author was
writing on behalf of all students (collective lan-
guage), and for the other half the author was
writing on behalf of themselves (personal lan-
guage). Collective versus personal language was
manipulated using the following passage (per-
sonal language in parentheses): 
On behalf of every university student in Australia [As a
university student], I would like to express the
disgust and cynicism that we [I] feel when we [I]
hear politicians sprout about their commitment to
the higher education system. We students [I] have
witnessed savage cuts to education funding while at
the same time being expected to pay hefty up-front
fees and/or HECS. It is clear to each and every one of
us [me] that the financial contribution that we [I]
now make to our [my] education is not for the
purposes of improving or even simply maintaining
higher education standards. Rather, we are [I am]
paying through the nose so that the Federal
government can cut public funding and walk away,
leaving behind a higher education system that we
all [I] fear is becoming an international joke.
After reading the letter, participants rated the
extent to which the author ‘claims to be speak-
ing on behalf of students’, and the extent to
which the author ‘claims to be speaking only for
themselves’ (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). After
reverse-scoring the second item, these measures
were combined to form a check on the manipu-
lation of language ( = .83).
Participants then completed a short question-
naire that measured evaluation of the author
(positive regard), evaluation of the message (effec-
tiveness), and perceived representativeness of the
comments. Positive regard was measured by
asking the extent to which they thought the
author was: trustworthy, open-minded, likable,
interesting, and nice (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much;  = .81). Effectiveness was measured by
asking ‘How persuasive do you think the letter
will be for people who are not students?’, and
‘How effective do you think the letter will be in
changing public opinion?’ (1 = not at all, 7 =
very much;  = .73). Finally, representativeness
was measured by asking participants the extent
to which they thought most university students
would ‘feel comfortable with’, ‘agree with’, and
‘feel represented by’ the author’s comments
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much;  = .87).
To check whether positive regard, effective-
ness, and representativeness represent discrete
constructs and not a single underlying dimen-
sion, a factor analysis was conducted on these
items using principal components extraction
with direct oblimin rotation. As expected, a
simple three-factor solution emerged, with the
first factor comprising the five positive regard
items (eigenvalue = 4.46, 44.59% of variance
explained), the second factor comprising the
three representativeness items (eigenvalue =
1.41, 14.10% of variance explained), and the
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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third factor comprising the two effectiveness
items (eigenvalue = 1.10, 11.04% of variance
explained). Intercorrelations among factors
ranged from .35 to .45.
Results
Analyses were conducted using 2 (Advocate
Type: official versus unofficial)  2 (Language:
collective versus personal)  2 (Identification:
low versus high) analyses of variance
(ANOVAs).1 Participants were categorized as
high (M = 5.73) or low identifiers (M = 3.84)
based on a median split. It is, of course, possible
that low and high identifiers would have differ-
ent attitudes regarding government funding for
universities, and that this difference might have
an effect on the results. However, preliminary
analyses showed this was not the case. On the
question of whether university students get ‘a
good deal’ from the government, low (M = 3.70)
and high identifiers (M = 3.76) did not differ
(F(1, 180) = 0.06, p = .82, 2 = .00). Thus, we
assumed any effects of identification to be inde-
pendent of pre-existing attitudes or politics.
Manipulation check
In line with the language manipulation, partici-
pants in the collectivist language condition
perceived the author to be speaking on behalf
of the group (M = 5.92) more than did those
in the personal language condition (M = 4.22)
(F(1, 180) = 65.99, p < .001, 2 = .27). No other
main effects or interactions emerged on this
measure.
Positive regard In line with Hypothesis 1, a
main effect of identification emerged such that
high identifiers (M = 4.32) had greater positive
regard for the advocate than did low identifiers
(M = 4.01) (F(1, 180) = 4.72, p = .031, 2 = .03).
This main effect, however, was qualified by a
marginally significant interaction between
identification, type of advocate, and language
(F(1, 180) = 3.48, p = .064, 2 = .02) (see
Table 1). Follow-up analyses revealed that, for
high identifiers, there were no significant main
effects or interactions. In contrast, for low
identifiers, a significant interaction emerged
between type of advocate and language (F(1,
180) = 5.53, p = .020, 2 = .03).
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, analyses of
simple main effects showed that, when evaluat-
ing official representatives, low identifiers
preferred those who used personal language
(M = 4.23) to those who used collective lan-
guage (M = 3.66) (F(1, 180) = 5.30, p = .022,
2 = .03). In contrast, they did not discriminate
between unofficial representatives depending
on whether they used personal (M = 3.97) or
collective language (M = 4.26), (F(1, 180) =
1.17, p = .28, 2 = .01), a result that is consistent
with Hypothesis 4.
Effectiveness Consistent with Hypothesis 1,
high identifiers (M = 3.69) saw the message to
Hornsey et al. language and group advocacy
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Table 1. Evaluations of advocate as a function of identification, advocate type, and language
Low identifiers High identifiers
Official Unofficial Official Unofficial
representative representative representative representative
Collective Personal Collective Personal Collective Personal Collective Personal
Positive regard 3.66 4.23 4.23 3.97 4.24 4.23 4.34 4.47
(1.06) (1.06) (0.66) (1.03) (0.73) (0.91) (0.97) (0.84)
Effectiveness 2.67 3.28 3.62 3.15 3.80 3.20 3.95 3.91
(1.28) (1.32) (1.15) (1.36) (1.14) (0.99) (1.19) (1.07)
Representativeness 4.90 5.15 5.20 4.97 5.38 4.83 5.44 5.58
(1.25) (0.73) (0.98) (1.04) (0.68) (0.97) (1.25) (0.75)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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be more effective overall than did low identi-
fiers (M = 3.18) (F(1, 179) = 9.27, p = .003,
2 = .05). Unexpectedly, unofficial advocates
(M = 3.66) were also seen to be more effective
overall than were official advocates (M = 3.22)
(F(1, 179) = 5.85, p = .017, 2 = .03). However,
these main effects were qualified by a signifi-
cant interaction between identification, type of
advocate, and language (F(1, 179) = 5.44, p =
.021, 2 = .03) (see Table 1). As for ratings of
positive regard, no significant main effects or
interactions emerged for high identifiers. For
low identifiers, however, there was a significant
interaction between type of advocate and lan-
guage (F(1,179) = 6.03, p = .015, 2 = .03).
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, analyses of
simple main effects showed that low identifiers
believed official representatives were more
effective when they used personal language
(M = 3.28) than when they used collective
language (M = 2.67) (F(1, 179) = 4.66, p = .032,
2 = .02). There was no evidence that low iden-
tifiers perceived the effectiveness of unofficial
representatives to be different depending on
whether they used personal (M = 3.15) or
collective language (M = 3.62) (F(1, 179) = 1.83,
p = .18, 2 = .01), a result that is consistent with
Hypothesis 4.
Representativeness As for ratings of positive
regard and effectiveness, a significant three-way
interaction emerged between identification,
type of advocate, and language (F(1, 180) =
4.00, p = .047, 2 = .02) (see Table 1). On this
occasion, there were no significant main effects
or interactions for low identifiers. For high
identifiers, on the other hand, there was a sig-
nificant interaction between type of advocate
and language (F(1, 179) = 4.01, p = .047,
2 = .02). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, high
identifiers believed the group would feel better
represented by an official advocate when they
used collective language (M = 5.38) than when
they used personal language (M = 4.83) (F(1,
180) = 4.31, p = .039, 2 = .02). On the other
hand, in line with Hypothesis 4, there was no
evidence that high identifiers perceived differ-
ences in the extent to which the unofficial
advocate represented the group well depending
on whether they used personal (M = 5.58) or
collective language (M = 5.44) (F(1, 180) =
0.54, p = .46, 2 = .00).
Discussion
The current data revealed no simple prescrip-
tions as to when advocacy will be perceived to
be successful and when it will not. Rather, a
complex but consistent relationship emerged
between the type of advocate, the type of lan-
guage they used, and the extent to which
people identified with their group.
Overall, rhetorical styles that emphasized the
collective (‘we believe’) were evaluated no
more positively than were rhetorical styles that
emphasized a personal viewpoint (‘I believe’).
One possible reason for the lukewarm manner
in which such rhetoric was received is that
collective language does not take into account
the differences that exist among group
members. Not all people would necessarily feel
comfortable being categorized as a group
member, because the group does not form an
important part of their self-concept. For these
people, there might emerge a feeling of dis-
comfort stemming from the fact that they are
being spoken for, but in a way that they do not
completely endorse.
Evidence for such a process can be seen in
the moderating role of identification. On
measures of effectiveness and positive regard,
the pattern was the same. Overall, low identi-
fiers evaluated official advocates more positively
when they used personal rather than collective
language and they believed official advocates
were more effective in promoting change when
they used personal rather than collective
language. There was no evidence, however, that
high identifiers viewed the advocates differently
on these measures depending on the type of
language used. On measures of the extent to
which participants thought the group as a
whole would feel well represented by the
comments, the pattern was slightly different.
On this measure (based on what participants
believed others would think) high identifiers
believed that the group would feel better rep-
resented by official advocates using collective
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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rather than personal language, whereas low
identifiers did not differ between the rhetorical
styles. Overall, the pattern of results shows that,
when high identifiers expressed a preference
for the type of rhetorical style official advocates
should use (i.e. on the representativeness
measure), it was in favor of collective language.
In contrast, when low identifiers expressed a
preference (i.e. on ratings of effectiveness and
positive regard), it was in favor of personal
language.
Such a finding makes sense from a social
identity perspective. According to this perspec-
tive, any action that draws attention to a group
membership potentially leads to the process of
self-categorization. The more group members
identify with a salient group, the more they will
define themselves according to their social
identity and the less they will identify them-
selves according to their idiosyncratic personal
identity (Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). A
simple extension of this idea is that high iden-
tifiers should be more comfortable with collec-
tive language, because they are being
categorized in a way that is consistent with how
they define themselves—as a group member.
Low identifiers, on the other hand, might feel
a degree of categorization threat, because the
way they are being categorized by the advocate
does not map on to how they define themselves
(Barreto & Ellemers, 2002; Branscombe et al.,
1999). For this reason, they may prefer that
collective action be pursued as a series of indi-
vidual voices (the anecdotal approach) rather
than as a collective voice.
This finding runs counter to many stereo-
types about what collective action looks like.
Frequently, group-based interests are repre-
sented and articulated by official advocates who
are explicitly invested with the power to speak
on behalf of the group. On the surface, the
notion of an official representative relying on
first-person rhetorical strategies seems to run
counter to role expectations. And yet this is pre-
cisely the type of strategy that low identifiers
respond most positively to. When an official
advocate uses collective language, low identi-
fiers rate them relatively poorly and see them to
be relatively ineffective. In fact, on ratings of
message effectiveness and positive regard
toward the speaker, the lowest ratings of all the
conditions emerged when low identifiers were
presented with an official advocate using collec-
tive language.
It is interesting to speculate on what impli-
cations this might have for collective action.
Research on minority influence (e.g. Mugny &
Perez, 1991) shows that to be an effective agent
of social change, groups should present a
united, consistent message. However, when
engaged in collective action, group members
might experience a conflict between (a)
needing to homogenize with other group
members in order to maximize the influence
and political effectiveness of their message, and
(b) needing to protect against categorization
threat (see also Brewer, 1991; Hornsey & Jetten,
2004; Simon, 1997, for related discussions of
the need for individual distinctiveness within
groups). This tension might be particularly
strong among those for whom the group is not
central to their self-concept. Faced with what
amounts to an irreconcilable conflict, it would
be understandable if people psychologically
withdrew from collective forms of protest and
relied on individualistic strategies instead. This
alienation of low identifiers comes at an
obvious cost, because it is these people who
must be energized and harnessed if collective
action is to reach the type of critical mass that
would be expected to bring about change.
Before concluding, two comments should be
made in relation to the type of advocate. First,
the effect of identification and rhetorical style
only emerged for official advocates. For un-
official advocates, there appeared to be less
concern about the type of rhetorical style used.
As explained earlier, one possible explanation
for this result is that official representatives are
seen, by virtue of their senior role, to have
psychologically separated themselves from the
rank-and-file members. As a result, their claims
to speak on behalf of all group members
arouses more resentment among low identifiers
than when similar claims are made by un-
official, emergent leaders within the group.
Whereas high identifiers might feel happy to be
homogenized as a member of the collective—
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and indeed might even see such rhetorical
strategies as consistent with the role of the
official advocate—low identifiers might feel
doubly alienated by such language. Not only
are they being categorized in a way that is not
consistent with their self-definition, they are
being categorized as such by one of them. An
alternative explanation, however, is that people
simply are not as vigilant with regard to the
rhetorical choices of unofficial advocates,
because relative to official representatives they
might be seen as less careful and strategic in
their speech. This relative naiveté with regard to
their rhetorical ‘choice’ could mean that un-
official advocates are forgiven for their enthusi-
astic, collective language in a way that official
representatives are not. Future research should
address the psychological underpinnings of the
interaction between language and advocate
type, with a broader view to examining in more
detail the previously underexplored differences
between official and unofficial advocates.
The second finding that deserves comment is
that unofficial representatives were seen to be
more effective overall than were official repre-
sentatives. Although this main effect was quali-
fied by identification and language, the overall
trend deserves some comment. Given that
official advocates are employed, at least in part,
to prosecute the interests of the group, it is
striking that they are generally regarded to be
less effective than are rank-and-file members
who speak on behalf of the group. The per-
suasion literature throws up some ideas as to
why this might be the case. Perceived trust-
worthiness is often viewed as the most import-
ant criterion for credibility (Cronkhite & Liska,
1976; Perloff, 1993). One factor that can com-
promise this trust is when we know that a
person has a vested interest in their message
(Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). When we
expect that a person will hold a particular
opinion because their role or group member-
ship demands it, then we infer certain biases
that undermine our confidence in the veracity
of their message. Intuitively, this makes sense. If
we believe that somebody is motivated to not
look objectively at an issue (knowledge bias) or
that the pressures of the situation might lead
them to disguise unpalatable truths (reporting
bias), we are less likely to trust them. Given that
the representative’s role is a very partisan one
where the single objective is to prosecute the
interests of the group, it would be reasonable to
expect that a representative would always be
operating—quite consciously—with bias. Thus,
it is possible that a message stemming from an
official advocate is more likely to be dismissed
as biased than would a message from a rank-and
file member, both by the general public and by
their own constituency. If this overall tendency
to perceive unofficial advocates to be more
effective than official advocates proved to be
robust, it would seem a sensible next step to
measure attributions regarding the motives for
their comments, and to see whether they
mediate the effect.
In conclusion, the need for group advocates
to demonstrate strength through unity and the
politically ‘instinctual’ appreciation for the
power of identifying with the group, often leads
to the rhetorical strategy of speaking for all (the
group). A preliminary reading of the literature
on leadership lends suggestive support for such
an approach; the strategic use of inclusive
language could help locate the speaker as a
central member of the group and thus
maximize his or her credibility and persuasive
power (e.g. Hogg, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins,
1996a, 1996b). But the current research
suggests a more complicated link between
language and outcomes for official advocates.
Whereas inclusive language might be seen as
appropriate in the eyes of high identifiers (and,
theoretically, in the eyes of third parties), low
identifiers might baulk at being spoken on
behalf of. To reduce the risk of alienating
marginal members or those who simply feel too
much the weight of inclusivity, the optimal
rhetorical strategy, in some circumstances,
may be to use anecdotal personal language to
articulate the beliefs and aspirations of the
wider group.
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Note
1. It should be noted that the interpretation of the
effects reported below do not change regardless
of whether we covary out age and sex.
Furthermore, the interpretation of the effects
remains the same regardless of whether the
analyses are conducted through ANOVA or
through regression. Thus, for ease of reporting
and interpretation, we have chosen to report the
results through ANOVA using a median split on
identification.
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